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Abstract
“American Digital Election Infrastructure: Policy, Risks, Options”
By
Tyson Himes

Faculty Advisor: Alan DiGaetano
Why is US digital election infrastructure (DEI) in a vulnerable state and what are the possible
options to better secure it? To answer these questions systematically, federal policy and current
DEI are analyzed through a risk management lens, including both elite and democratic models of
risk management. This analysis suggests that DEI is at risk because federal policy currently
enables states to use Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines without a paper trail
and allows states to manage their own risk environment with respect to digital voter registration
databases (VRDs). This in turn produces significant variance in outcomes in levels of cyber
security and priority of VRD governance. These factors combine to present serious
vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a targeted attack during a Presidential election to
disastrous consequence. As a result, policy options and potential technical improvements to DEI
should be explored.

iv

Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Alan DiGaetano, for his most
valuable feedback and help throughout this process. His suggestions have substantially improved
the quality of this work. I would also like to thank all of the staff and faculty at the Graduate
Center for providing an open and collegial environment in which to grow. Attending this
institution has been a priceless experience. Lastly, I would like to thank my partner, Charlotte
Jeffries, for her diligent copy editing and feedback for the past two years. I would not have been
able to do any of this without her.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1

II.

Frames of Analysis…………………………………..……………………………...4
a. Risk Management………………………….………………………………….....5
b. Hierarchy of Needs……………………………….………………………….......8
c. Policy Research Methodology…………………………….…………………......8

III.

Analysis of Current Voting Policy………………..………………………………....9
a. Constitutional Context…………………………………………………….……10
b. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965……………………………….………..10
c. The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993…………………….….11
d. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002………………………...………12

IV.

Current Digital Election Infrastructure Vulnerabilities……………………….……..17
a. Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines…….………..………....17
b. Digital Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)……………….………..……….20
c. VRD Architecture………………………..……….……………………..……..21
d. VRD Risks……………………………….…………………..………………...22

V.

Policy Options………………………………………………………………………..26
a. Secure Elections Act…………………….……...……………………………...26
b. For the People Act……………………….………………..…………………...27
c. Other Policy Options………………….………………………………..……...28

VI.

Potential Technical Improvements to Digital Election Infrastructure…………….…29
a. Open-Source Technology………………..…………………………………....29
b. Estonian KSI Stack……..…………………….…………...…………………..30

vi

VII.

Conclusion…………………………………….……………………………………..32

VIII.

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………36

List of Tables
Table 1: Election Environment Hierarchy of Needs……………………………………………....8

vii

Abbreviations
CI - Critical Infrastructure
COTS - Commercial Off-The-Shelf
DDoS - Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack
DEI - Digital Election Infrastructure
DHS - The Department of Homeland Security
DRE - Direct-Recording Electronic Voting Machines
HAVA - The Help America Vote Act of 2002
NVRA - The National Voter Reform Act of 1993
VRA - The Voting Rights Act of 1965
VRD - Digital Voter Registration Database

viii

Introduction

America’s elections are under attack. In the age of the internet, those who wish to subvert
elections can do so from the comfort of their home countries, out of the reach of US law
enforcement. When data necessary for the smooth functioning of electoral democracy is
transmitted and stored digitally, hackers only need the slightest crack in cyber security to affect
the outcomes of elections. This raises concern about the integrity of US elections and national
security.
New policy is necessary to properly regulate elections in ways consistent with the ideals
of representative democracy. Article 1, Section 4 of the US Constitution empowers the states to
regulate most aspects of the election environment. Additionally, the Tenth Amendment reserves
powers for the states that are not expressly given to the federal government, nor prohibited by the
Constitution. Since there are few explicit powers given to the federal government to regulate
elections in the Constitution, the states have lawfully created election policies and the courts
have upheld such policies as properly being under the purview of the states. Partly as a result of
this decentralization, there has been a need over the years to enact federal policy to correct for
practices that limit suffrage rights (The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965, The National Voter
Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, etc.).
Currently there is a need for similar federal action to secure digital voter registration
databases (VRDs) and Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines in the age of the
internet. These actions can be justified as an effort to protect to universal suffrage, as all
registered US voters should be confident that their registration will be honored and that their vote
will be counted. Given the critical role of elections in sustaining democratic governance, secure
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functioning of the electoral environment is essential. VRDs and DREs are integral components in
maintaining that environment.1
Especially in light of the ongoing investigations into Russian meddling in the 2016
election, protecting the integrity of the vote from foreign as well as domestic threats is now
something the federal government recognizes as an urgent concern. In 2017, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) designated election infrastructure as critical infrastructure (CI).
Included in the designation of election infrastructure as CI is digital election infrastructure (DEI),
which is defined here as any complex digital system used in the administration of elections:
CI is a DHS designation established by the Patriot Act and given to ‘systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters’2
The nature of the threat is important to understand. In 2016, sensitive information (names,
birthdays, addresses, and the last four digits of social security numbers and driver’s licenses)
from nearly 200,000 records were stolen in Illinois, while malware was used to breach digital
voting records in Arizona.3 All told, foreign assailants scanned VRD systems in 39 states for
vulnerabilities.4

I consider VRDs and DREs part of America’s digital election infrastructure which I will refer to
as “DEI” throughout this thesis. I do not, however, consider remote digital voting in this thesis,
as it is not a widely used method of voting in the US.
2
“DHS Cybersecurity Services Catalog for Election Infrastructure.” Accessed March 21, 2019.
https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/DHS_Cybersecurity_Services_Catalog_for_Election_Infrastructu
re.pdf.
3
Norris, Pippa. Why American Elections Are Flawed (and How to Fix Them). Vol. 1. Cornell
University Press, 2017. Pp. 15.
4 “Russian Hacks on U.S. Voting System Wider Than Previously Known.” Accessed March 28,
2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-statesthreatens-future-u-s-elections.
1

2

In response to the above activity, studies examining American DEI have found systemic
weaknesses. One study published by The Center for American Progress called “Election Security
in All 50 States” was particularly damning. They assigned grades to the states based on basic
security standards. No state received an A, while eleven received D’s, and two received F’s.5
Further evidence of the state of DEI is proffered in the book Why American Elections Are
Flawed (And How to Fix Them) by elections expert Pippa Norris:
The aging equipment and vintage software used on many US electronic voting machines,
and the lack of sophisticated security to protect state voting records, make these
particularly vulnerable to external cyberattack by foreign powers and terrorist groups…it
would just take minor security breaches to some digital voting registers, electronic voting
machines, or software aggregating vote tabulations, in a few local polling places in a
couple of swing states, to reduce the credibility of American elections, throw the outcome
into chaos, and trigger doubts about the legitimacy of the eventual winner of the
presidential contest6
This prompts the following research questions: Why is US DEI in a vulnerable state and what are
the possible options to improve security? I answer these questions below by systematically
analyzing federal policy and current DEI through a risk management lens. DEI is at risk because
federal policy currently enables states to use Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) voting
machines without a paper trail. It also enables states to manage their own risk environment with
respect to VRDs, which produces significant variance in levels of cyber security and the priority
of VRD governance. These factors combine to present serious vulnerabilities that could be
exploited (in a targeted attack on swing states) during a Presidential election.
This thesis develops a risk management analytical framework for assessing DEI security
and then explains the methodology used in this assessment. Next, current federal election policy
Root, Danielle, Liz Kennedy, Michael Sozan, and Jerry Parshall. “Election Security in All 50
States.” Center for American Progress. Accessed April 4, 2019.
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/02/12/446336/electio
-security-50-states/. Pp. 31.
6
Norris, Why American Elections Are Flawed (and How to Fix Them), 15-16.
5
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is analyzed through a risk management lens in order to understand better whether current policy
is strong enough to guard against potential threats to the US election system. The vulnerabilities
in current digital election systems, specifically VRDs and DREs, are also examined. Lastly,
potential policy options as well as technical improvements are considered.

Frames of Analysis

The United States of America is the oldest democracy in the world. It is also the richest
country in the world in terms of national net wealth.7 So why does the US administer elections so
poorly when compared to other democracies?
The Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) developed a Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI)
survey to compare how democracies perform among a wide array of electoral processes.8 The
results show that the US substantially underperforms most Western democracies and ranks 52nd
globally (based on data gathered during elections in 2012 and 2014).9 When compared to other
Anglo-American democracies that share many common features like the UK, Australia, and
Canada, the US scores nearly 20 points lower for voter registration integrity, which is one of the
aspects of DEI that will be addressed in this thesis.10A large part of why Norris and the EIP have
concluded that the US performs well-below other Anglo-American democracies in voter
registration administration results from the lack of adequate DEI security.

“Global Wealth Report 2018.” Credit Suisse. Accessed April 11, 2019. https://www.creditsuisse.com/corporate/en/articles/news-and-expertise/global-wealth-report-2018-us-and-china-inthe-lead-201810.html.
8
Norris, Why American Elections Are Flawed (and How to Fix Them), 25.
9
Ibid., 28.
10
Ibid., 36.
7
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Risk Management
Given the status of the US as a global political and financial power, why has it not been
able to secure its elections adequately? To answer this and other questions (mentioned above),
DEI is analyzed from a risk management frame of reference in order to compose an informed
argument. Risk management of DEI includes decisions that affect cyber security of VRDs, and
the use of DREs.
The definition of risk employed here derives from Accident and Design: contemporary
debates in risk management by Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones. For them,
“‘Risk’...connotes the assessment of consequence or ‘exposure to the chance of loss”.11
Consequence in the context of elections is a high stakes game. As noted in the introduction,
manipulation of VRDs or DREs in a few swing states could alter the results of a presidential
election. This is an extremely sensitive issue from the perspective of ordinary Americans. Just
one individual’s vote not being counted adversely affects attitudes on election integrity.12 If votes
are successfully manipulated, the legitimacy of the US electoral systems could be undermined as
popular confidence is vital to sustaining democratic processes. Altered vote tallies could affect
outcomes on two levels: results and attitudes. This is the risk environment in which election
security policy operates.
Having defined risk and the risk environment, two aspects of election security can be
investigated: risk analysis and risk management. Risk analysis, also referred to as risk

11

Hood, Christopher, and David K. C. Jones, Eds. Accident and Design: contemporary debates
in risk management. London ; Bristol, Pa: UCL Press, 1996. Pp. 2-3.
12
“Concerns about Voter Access and Eligibility | Pew Research Center,” October 29, 2018.
https://www.people-press.org/2018/10/29/concerns-about-eligible-voters-beingprevented-from-voting-and-ineligible-voters-voting/.
5

assessment, is the process of quantifying the probability of an adverse event as well as potential
consequences using mathematical or engineering techniques.13 Daniel J. Fiorino, in his article,
“Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis,” claims that risk assessment is aligned with
an elite theory of government, which privileges technical expertise over lay opinion. Fiorino
claims that:
The technical model of risk analysis reflects several characteristics of elite theory. Its emphasis
on results (fatalities avoided, net benefits maximized) exhibits a one-dimensional approach,
because it equates interest with the substance of policy outcomes and ignores process. It is
assumed that the general public interest is achieved when governmental policy is in accord with
the judgment of elites14

Risk management, on the other hand, is inherently political, and encompasses more than just
assessment because it entails an approach to governance.15 Deciding how to manage risk requires
making choices that have political effects.
Hood and Jones explain how risk management is “a process involving the three basic
elements of any control system…namely: goal-setting (whether explicit or implicit), information
gathering and interpretation,” and “action to influence human behavior, modify physical
structures or both”.16 With risk management of DEI, “goal-setting” includes an approach to VRD
governance at the institutional level. This includes making decisions on whether to require
certification, regulation, and/or authorization by statute.17 The “information gathering and
interpretation” process allows states to assess the nature of the threat and to locate available

Smith, Denis, and Alan Irwin. “Public Attitudes to Technological Risk: The Contribution of
Survey Data to Public Policy-Making.” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 9,
no. 4 (1984): 419. https://doi.org/10.2307/621778. Pp. 419.
14
Fiorino, Daniel J. “Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis.” Risk Analysis 9, no. 3
(September 1989): 293–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.1989.tb00994.x. Pp. 297.
15
Fiorino, “Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis,” 297.
16
Hood and Jones, Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk Management, 6.
17
“Electronic Poll Books | E-Poll Books.” Accessed April 11, 2019.
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-pollbooks.aspx.
13
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resources. This process includes analyzing the risk environment and tailoring it to the needs of
the specific state and taking advantage of cyber security resources. The last level (“action to
influence human behavior, modify physical structures or both”) includes auditing systems after
attacks, developing additional security measures, and properly training election officials in cyber
security methods. These three elements (goal-setting, information gathering and interpretation,
and action to influence human behavior, modify physical structures or both) act as a lens through
which to assess how states manage risk in their DEI. State level risk is difficult to assess when
viewed on the national level, as US elections are highly decentralized and risk is mostly localized
under our federal system.
Rather than relying solely on a technical model of risk management (which is aligned
with elite theory), the argument developed here also adopts a democratic model of risk
assessment, as proposed by Fiorino:18
The democratic model evaluates risk based on its social and political consequences, such
as possible disruption in the social fabric or a loss of communality. Lay criteria for
assessing the impact of risk decisions…are embedded in cultural values. Similarly, lay
evaluations of risk incorporate substantive and procedural democratic values, such as the
acceptability of processes for making decisions, the ethics of the distribution of risk, and
the capacity to control a source of risk in the community’s interests. Finally, the
democratic model relates judgments about risks to the competence (Can we trust them?)
and the legitimacy (Should we trust them?) of the social institutions that impose and
control those risks19
This approach means a commitment to democratic processes and “a two-dimensional perspective
that assesses policy processes and institutions not only by their end results, but by their
compatibility with substantive and procedural democratic values”.20 To align with this approach,
current policy and the resulting technical vulnerabilities are assessed, not only from a technical

18

This will primarily be applied in the Policy Options section.
Fiorino, “Technical and Democratic Values in Risk Analysis,” 296.
20
Ibid., 297.
19
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point of view, but also from the perspective of democratic values, in accordance with the
Constitution and the belief held broadly by the public. To bolster this democratic model
approach, Pew Research Center survey data on public perception of digital election systems is
used. Public confidence in the institutions responsible for safeguarding election infrastructure is
thus necessarily a component in the democratic risk management model outlined above.

Hierarchy of Needs
An assessment of risk in the election environment would benefit greatly from the use of
the concept of a hierarchy of needs. Table 1 reports the hierarchy of needs as applied to assessing
policy and digital systems. Though voter suppression is a real threat, and voter ID laws can turn
away potential voters, access is meaningless if voter registration is not honored and votes are not
accurately reflected in final tallies. Equally, for accuracy of the vote, without proper security, the
results can be manipulated. Most federal election policy to date (e.g. VRA, NVRA, HAVA, etc.)
has been to promote access to the vote. The below research indicates that focus should now be
shifted to security.
Table 1: Election Environment Hierarchy of Needs
Convenience
Efficiency (monetary efficiency and efficiency of operations)
Access / Accuracy
Security
Scale: Bottom = Most Important; Top = Least Important

Policy Research Methodology

8

Lastly, the analysis of election security is partly framed by the unique methodology of
policy research. Moran et al. detail this methodology in The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy.
They claim that:
Policy research requires a profoundly different methodology from that on which basic
research relies, because policy research is always dedicated to changing the world while
basic research seeks to understand it as it is… Even those policies whose purpose is to
maintain the status quo are promoting change—they aim to slow down or even reverse
processes of deterioration21
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze current policy to determine why digital election systems
are at risk and to explore whether a change in policy is warranted. If a change in policy is
necessary, the challenge is to “determine the relative resistance to change according to the
different variables that are to be tackled” systematically.22 These methods are outside the scope
of this thesis as policy researchers must “include at least all the variables that account for a
significant degree of variance in the phenomenon that the policy aims to change”.23 This is a task
for future, funded research, which is addressed at the end of this thesis.

Analysis of Current Voting Policy

The American policy regime that governs DEI is still in its infancy. For that reason, only
modern voting policy will be analyzed, as policy crafted before the advent of the internet did not
foresee the regulatory frameworks that would need to be created to account for the radical shift

21

Moran, Michael, Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin, Eds. The Oxford Handbook of Public
Policy. The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006. Pp. 833.
22
Ibid., 836.
23
Ibid., 838-839.
9

in technology. The constitutional basis for elections needs to be examined first in order to
provide context.

Constitutional Context
Elections are mostly managed by the states, stemming from Article 1, Section 4 of the US
Constitution which states, “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the place of Chusing
Senators”.24 Also, the Tenth Amendment, which reserves power to the states that are not
explicitly given to the federal government in the Constitution, heavily influenced the evolution of
election policy in the United States. Since the Constitution provides few powers to the federal
government for regulating elections, states are largely free to govern their own elections. This
has ultimately resulted in discriminatory practices in election administration. In order to bolster
suffrage in the face of these practices, several Constitutional Amendments (15th, 19th, and 26th)
were ratified.

The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965
The federal government has also stepped in to secure the right to the vote more firmly
through national legislation. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 was one of the earliest such
modern policies of consequence. The VRA sought to protect the suffrage rights of AfricanAmericans who were subjected to discriminatory practices like the Grandfather Clause, poll
taxes, and literacy tests.

24

US Const. art. I, sec. 4.
10

Digital security was not yet an issue when the VRA was passed as the technology to
produce digital infrastructure was not yet available. The VRA largely left it up to the states
(except for the states subject to federal preclearance) to maintain properly paper voter rolls and
the administration of voting technology, which at the time included “hand-counted paper,
mechanical lever machines, punch-card machines” and “scanned paper ballots”.25 In summation,
the VRA did not anticipate a digital environment with complex systems that are vulnerable to
compromise by malicious actors in a digital environment.

The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993
In contrast to the VRA, the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993 was passed
after the advent of the internet, but digital technology was still not ubiquitous. The NVRA was
tied to suffrage rights and mandated that citizens be offered the ability to register to vote in
federal elections in all 50 states when getting a license at the department of motor vehicles
(according to Section 5 of the NVRA) hence the nickname, the “motor voter law”.26 Additional
sections of the NVRA of import include Section 6, which “requires that States offer voter
registration opportunities by mail-in application,” Section 7, which “requires that States offer
voter registration opportunities at certain State and local offices,” and Section 8, which “contains
requirements with respect to the administration of voter registration by States and requires States
to implement procedures to maintain accurate and current voter registration lists”.27

“Voting Technology | MIT Election Lab.” Accessed April 11, 2019.
https://electionlab.mit.edu/research/voting-technology.
26
“The National Voter Registration Act Of 1993 (NVRA),” August 6, 2015.
https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra.
27
Ibid.
25
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Furthermore, once signed into law, the NVRA effectively regulated both federal and state
elections due to the need for efficiency:
Although enacted pursuant to Congress's power to regulate congressional elections under
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, the NVRA effectively changed the registration
processes for all elections, given the impracticability and inefficiency of maintaining
separate voting lists for federal and state elections28
One key component of the NVRA, Section 8, was the mandate to protect the integrity of the
voter rolls.29 Given that digital systems were still not commonplace, there were no instructions to
the states regarding digital voter rolls, though states must apply the standard of maintaining upto-date and accurate voter rolls to the digital context in order to comply with the NVRA.

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002
The policy trailblazer for DEI was the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, which
was passed in the wake of the controversial 2000 Presidential election. The relevant portion of
HAVA, as it pertains to VRD security is Section 303, which provides a framework for
implementing a centralized, digital system at the state level. It requires that “Each State, acting
through the chief State election official, shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory
manner, a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter
registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the State level”.30
After HAVA, the states set about creating the mandated computerized registration lists,
which I refer to as VRDs (though they are sometimes referred to as e-poll books). The states

Tokaji, Daniel. “Voter Registration and Election Reform.” The William and Mary Bill of
Rights Journal 17, no. 2 (2008): 453-506. Pp. 467-468.
29
Ibid., 467.
30
U.S. Congress. House. The Help America Vote Act of 2002. HR 3295. 107th Cong., 2nd sess.
Introduced in House November 14, 2001. https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th
congress/house-bill/3295/text.
28
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created three different VRD systems (according to which level data is stored) in total: top-down,
bottom-up, and hybrid.31
Some states adopted a single, central platform at the state level that connected to
terminals in local jurisdictions. This type of system is typically referred to as a “topdown” voter registration system. Other states have a state voter registration database that
gathers and aggregates information from their local jurisdictions’ voter registration
databases. This type of system is typically referred to as a “bottom-up” system. Other
states have what is termed a hybrid system, a system with a mix of top-down and bottomup characteristics32
In addition to the variance in list construction there is significant variance in how the states have
chosen to create legal frameworks for such lists (whether top-down, bottom-up, or hybrid).
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL):
In some states, the use of e-poll books is specifically authorized in statute. In other states, e-poll
books are mentioned in statute but their use is not specifically authorized. Some state statutes
don’t mention e-poll books at all, but state-level elections organizations issue regulations for their
use. Finally, some states have some jurisdictions that use e-poll books but have no statewide
guidance on their use. There are jurisdictions in 32 states that currently use e-poll books, and
Alabama will soon become the 33rd, with the enactment of a pilot program for the use of e-poll
books in the state33

Furthermore, VRDs are not certified in a uniform manner by the states.34 Eight states require
certification of VRDs by the Secretary of State in order for them to be used.35
Thus far, three levels of variance have been identified: variance in system (top-down,
bottom-up, hybrid), variance in legal framework (some lists mentioned in statues, some are not),
and variance in certification (eight states requiring certification). As it pertains to specific
technical standards for cyber security, HAVA provides minimal requirements. In Section 303, it
is stated that, the “appropriate State or local official shall provide adequate technological security

“Statewide Voter Registration Systems | US Election Assistance Commission.” Accessed April
5, 2019. https://www.eac.gov/statewide-voter-registration-systems/.
32
Ibid.
33
“Electronic Poll Books | E-Poll Books”.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
31
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measures to prevent the unauthorized access to the computerized list established under this
section”.36 This language avoids mandating specific systems that might provide enhanced cyber
security or specific security measures that states must take in order to secure their systems.
Compliance with the guidelines was entirely voluntary. Section 221 created a Technical
Guidelines Development Committee aimed at developing voluntary guidelines once members
were appointed and a nine month period had elapsed.37 One component of the committee’s work
was to support the states in obtaining “the security of computers, computer networks, and
computer data storage used in voting systems, including the computerized list required under
section 303(a)”.38 This language gives broad latitude to the states in developing their own
systems and according to what they judge to be best practices. HAVA, in short, permits states
to make different judgments about best practices.
This adds another level of significant variance, that of technical cyber security standards.
The states vary in their usage of the following common cyber security practices, such as: access
controls, passwords, multi-factor authentication (MFA), logging and monitoring activity,
training, regular back-ups, provisional ballots, and communicating with other states.39
When this variance is viewed through the lens of risk management (goal-setting,
information gathering and interpretation, and action to influence human behavior) outcomes
differ enormously. Goal-setting differs among states, as evidenced by variance in systems, legal
frameworks, certifications, and technical standards for VRDs. Some states are more proactive
and provide a more robust institutional basis for their VRDs, while some do not even mention
36

U.S. Congress. House. The Help America Vote Act of 2002.
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
“Election Security | Cybersecurity: What Legislators (and Others) Need to Know.” Accessed
April 5, 2019. http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election
security.aspx.
37
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VRDs by statute.40 This implies that some states have different goals for their VRDs. In states
where robust, legal frameworks are created, VRDs are clearly being prioritized, while in states
where VRDs are barely even mentioned, they are clearly less of a priority.
On the risk management level of information gathering and interpretation, most states do
not have the appropriate resources to gather and interpret information on cyber security.41 States
do, however, have access to outside resources that can assist them in this task, like the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Center for Internet Security (CIS), but these
partnerships are entirely voluntary. For instance, DHS provides state partners with the tools to
gather information and interpret threats through a comprehensive, cost-effective cyber security
program.42
Lastly, the states vary in their actions to influence human behavior. States respond
differently to the risk environment and to breaches in security. Some, like Illinois, underwent a
complete review of cyber security after their VRD was compromised in 2016. They enhanced
their cyber security in the aftermath of the 2016 election with monthly audits, daily back-ups,
and by monitoring unsuccessful attempts to log into their system.43 Meanwhile, Arizona, which
was also attacked in 2016, received a below-average grade for election security in a February
2018 report by the Center for American Progress.44 Other states have still not instituted simple
measures like effectively training election officials in cyber security measures.45 And if states do

Root et al., “Election Security in All 50 States”.
Ibid.
42
“Election Security.” Department of Homeland Security, March 27, 2018.
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/election-security.
43
Becker, David, Jacob Kipp, Jack R. Williams, and Jenny Lovell. “Voter Registration Database
Security.” The Center for Election Innovation Research. September 2018. Pp. 15.
44
Root et al., “Election Security in All 50 States”.
45
Ibid.
40
41
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provide training to election officials, there is additional variance in the quality of training use
these systems.46
These variations apply only to VRD cyber security and governance as analyzed through
HAVA standards. DREs do not qualify as a control system, where the three levels of risk
management (goal-setting, information gathering and interpretation, and action to influence
human behavior, modify physical structures, or both) are leveraged to properly mitigate risk.
Using DREs without a paper trial is a binary choice - either states use them or they do not. There
are other voting technologies that could effectively replace DREs, but the states do not have a
choice whether or not to deploy VRDs as they are mandated by HAVA.
HAVA brought Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) machines into the election
environment with their mandate to modernize voting technology and the funding that
accompanied it (see Sec. 251, Sec 271, and Sec. 281 of HR 3295). After receiving this funding
many states procured DREs that did not produce a paper trail and still use those original
machines to this day. According to the Brennan Center, twelve states are currently using DREs
without a paper trail “in at least some counties and towns” (Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and
Texas).47 What is more, “Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina continue to use such
systems statewide”.48 Clearly, these twelve states are not properly managing their risk
environment by relying on this voting technology. Evidence on DRE vulnerabilities will be
provided in the next section.
46

Ibid.
“Voting Machines at Risk: Where We Stand Today | Brennan Center for Justice.” Accessed
March 16, 2019. http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/voting-machines-risk-where-we-standtoday.
48
“Voting Machines at Risk: Where We Stand Today | Brennan Center for Justice,” Ibid.
Parentheses removed from original.
47

16

In summation, the hands-off approach of federal policy produces four levels of
significant variance: system (top-down, bottom-up, hybrid), legal framework (some lists
mentioned in statues, some are not), certification (eight states require certification), and cyber
security standards. Dealing with the threat of cyber-attacks through federal policy would be
difficult as American elections have been thoroughly decentralized historically. Given the
modern threats of hacking, HAVA standards may not be sufficiently rigorous to protect
presidential elections because they allow states to manage their own risk environments. This
leads to significant variance in cyber security outcomes and provides vulnerabilities that can be
targeted to great effect.
According to the hierarchy of needs in the election environment outlined in the frames of
analysis section, security is now a more basic need than access. Most federal election policies to
date have been passed to increase access to the vote (e.g. VRA, NVRA, HAVA, etc.). In the age
of the internet, the focus should be shifted to security, as access can be affected through hacking,
VRDs can be manipulated to remove voters from the rolls, and DREs can be attacked to alter
votes cast. Given that we have robust policy in place ensuring access security has become a more
basic need to properly ensure suffrage rights. The specific, technical vulnerabilities that reinforce
the need for security in DEI are detailed below.

Current Digital Election Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines
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This section addresses the question of technical complexity that stems from US election
policy and focuses on the specific technical vulnerabilities with extant VRDs and DREs.
Initially, states were given incentives to upgrade their voting technology through the Help
America Vote Act of 2002. States could apply for grants to purchase DREs and other muchneeded equipment from accredited vendors. But paper trails were not mandated by HAVA, this
leading a number of states to invest heavily in DREs that did not produce a paper trail record of
votes cast. These paperless DREs rely entirely on machine generated internal records. The lack
of a paper trail makes DREs uniquely susceptible to manipulation when compared to the voting
technologies that the DREs replaced, like hand-counted paper ballots, mechanical lever
machines, punch cards, and scanned paper ballots.
According to some security experts, among voting technologies now in use, DREs are the
most at risk of large-scale manipulation:
Analysis of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows that it is vulnerable to
extremely serious attacks. For example, an attacker who gets physical access to a
machine or its removable memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious
code; malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records,
logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker
could also create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently from machine to
machine during normal election activities - a voting-machine virus49
Once these security vulnerabilities are reported, commercial vendors who manufacture DREs
often state that patches can be made to furnish greater security for the voting machines. But these
machines use proprietary code and only election officials (sometimes with the help of outside
agencies like DHS) can review the code for errors or malicious strings. Commercial vendors, as
a rule, do not use open-source code. They have a commercial interest in their code remaining
Feldman, Ariel J., J. Alex Halderman, Edward W. Felten. “Security Analysis of the Diebold
AccuVote-TS Voting Machine.” Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of
Computer Science, Princeton University. https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/ts06EVT.pdf. Pp. 1.
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proprietary and always push back against suggestions to adopt open-source code. Our state
election officials’ sign contracts with these vendors but do not employ enough qualified
cybersecurity experts to examine the vender code effectively. Thus, commercial vendors can
make every assurance that their machines will operate properly because it is in their best
commercial interest to do so and citizens are left in the dark.
Even if a vendor’s code is examined, the machines that show up on Election Day could
have their code changed from the time of the last audit. Since there is no uniform policy
nationwide, states can be more or less thorough in how they structure contracts with vendors and
review their code. This situation grants undue power to vendors in the administration of elections
and, as with any complex systems, creates many opportunities for failure. DREs are also
assembled from open supply chains that present specific risks. The Open Source Election
Technology (OSET) Institute, which published a briefing on election infrastructure in 2017,
observes that:
One fundamental source of technical risk to core EI cyber-assets is at the hardware level,
via threats from untrustworthy hardware components sourced from an open supply chain
with no controls or provenance on acquired components. This risk is particularly notable
for voting system components, certainly during the manufacturing process, but more
notably for EO operator maintenance in the use of replacement parts over the system
components’ extended life cycle. This practice has increased over time, due to the effect
of market forces on the vendors, and to the effect of EO’s reduced capacity for capital
expenditures50
As elections infrastructure has been declared critical infrastructure, this type of open supply
chain must be properly regulated to mitigate risk more effectively.
Though DREs may have created a more user-friendly, voting experience, they have
introduced more risk than prior technologies. According to Donald Moynihan, an expert in the
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application of digital government services, DREs perform worse than prior technologies based
on the residual vote. The residual vote is when votes are “lost because voters chose more than
one candidate, created an unreadable ballot, or left a ballot blank”.51 He claims that older voting
technologies were “relatively simple, with linear and predictable interactions between parts. To
varying degrees, the different technologies were imperfect in their ability to count votes, but
there was little risk of catastrophic failure”.52 He finds that based on the residual vote, voting
systems that have been replaced, like lever machines and manual counting, were more reliable.53
In summation, if vulnerable DREs are attacked and votes are manipulated, election outcomes
could be cast in doubt. And without a paper trail, a recount may not be able to uncover
irregularities.54
In the end, it may be preferable to remove the DRE machines altogether rather than
adding security measures for expensive equipment that is still susceptible to manipulation, even
when open-source code and a paper trail are mandated.

Digital Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)
Two widely publicized attacks on VRDs occurred in the 2016 Presidential election, both
attributed to Russian election interference. Sensitive information from nearly 200,000 records
was stolen in Illinois, while malware was used to breach digital voting records in Arizona55.
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Even after these attacks, there are still a substantial number of states that have not instituted basic
cyber security measures to protect their VRDs.56
The Center for American Progress, in a study called “Election Security in All 50 States,”
presents troubling facts about VRD security:
Some states still use voter registration databases that are more than a decade old, leaving
them susceptible to modern-day cyberattacks. If successfully breached, hackers could
alter or delete voter registration information, which in turn could result in eligible voters
being turned away at the polls or prevented from casting ballots that count. Hackers
could, for example, switch just a few letters in a registered voter’s name without
detection. In states with strict voter ID laws, eligible voters could be prevented from
voting because of discrepancies between the name listed in an official poll book and the
individual’s ID. In addition, by changing or deleting a registered individual’s political
affiliation, hackers could prevent would-be voters from participating in partisan
primaries57
Before discussing the technical components and resulting vulnerabilities that give rise to VRD
insecurity, it should be stated that information about specific aspects of systems is closely
guarded by the states. Publishing this data could serve as a road map for assailants wishing to
infiltrate VRDs. Thus researchers have largely published what the current, general standards are
for list creation, maintenance, and cyber security.

VRD Architecture
According to “A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security” published by the Center
for Internet Security, “Many of the components in elections infrastructure are built on general
purpose computing machines, such as traditional web servers and database platforms”.58 Most
election officials do not possess the budget or expertise to procure and run state of the art
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systems, thus the majority of VRDs are run on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and
software.
VRDs are created in three different ways with respect to data. According to the Center for
Internet Security:
In all of these cases, there is a master voter database at the state level. The 2014 EAC
Statutory Overview describes this database as populated in one of three broad ways: 1. A
top-down system in which the data are hosted on a single, central platform of hardware
and maintained by the state with data and information supplied by local jurisdictions, 2.
A bottom-up system in which the data are hosted on local hardware and periodically
compiled to form a statewide voter registration list, or 3. A hybrid approach, which is a
combination of a top-down and bottom-up system. For all three cases, voter registration
systems consist of one or more applications that leverage general-purpose computing
systems built on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware and software59
Risk varies according to the degree of centralization in data storage. Top-down systems attract
more attention from hackers because data is more centralized and therefore more easily hacked.
Bottom-up systems create a structure where sensitive data is stored at the local level, so state
agencies must contact local agencies for proof of registration. This makes it more difficult for
hackers to obtain large swaths of voter registration information in a single attack. The next
section will detail the resources available to election officials and the risks inherent in running a
sensitive operation with internet-connected, COTS software and hardware.

VRD Risks
The risk analysis resources available to election officials include, but are not limited to,
the following: International Organization for Standardization (ISO/IEC) 27005, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-30, and multiple
resources provided through The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) made available
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by request.60 These resources assist trained election officials in bolstering defenses and
identifying threats. Those states who follow best practices, train election officials, and consult
DHS have a relatively better chance of properly managing cyber threats than those states (of
which there are at least ten) that fail to provide any training for their election officials.61 But the
advantage is only relative as:
many election officials do not have the expertise or resources to conduct an adequate risk
assessment. The ability to efficiently and effectively execute a risk assessment is further
reduced by the difficulty in objectively assessing evolving threats, as well as the
complexity of the elections processes and systems62
The exact risks that election officials face are similar to those faced by virtue of running
commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS).63 These risks include:
Risks associated with established (whether persistent or intermittent) internet
connectivity, network connections with other internal systems, some of which may be
owned or operated by other organizations or authorities, security weaknesses in the
underlying COTS products, whether hardware or software, errors in properly managing
authentication and access control for authorized users, difficulty associated with finding,
and rolling back, improper changes found after the fact, and infrastructure - and process related issues associated with backup and auditing64
These are general risks to COTS systems, which are also present in digital VRDs. There are two
main forms of cyber-attack. The first would be to manipulate data in the VRD. This could be
done if an assailant gained remote access to the database. Whenever an input operation is
required, assailants potentially have the ability to gain remote access, either by stealing
usernames and passwords or by installing malware, as occurred in Arizona. According to the
Center for Internet Security, “the inputs to voter registration systems are registrations, removals

“A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security,” 8.
Root et al., “Election Security in All 50 States”.
62
“A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security,” 8.
63
Ibid., 16-17.
64
Ibid., 16-17.
60
61

23

due to ineligibility (e.g., an individual moving out of state, death of a voter), and record updates,
most often due to an individual moving within the state”.65
The second attack approach would be a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS),
which would make the VRD unavailable for election officials.66 Cisco, a multinational
technology conglomerate, defines a DDoS attack as “bombardment of simultaneous data requests
to a central server. The attacker generates these requests from multiple compromised systems. In
doing so, the attacker hopes to exhaust the target’s Internet bandwidth and RAM. The ultimate
goal is to crash the target’s system and disrupt its business”.67
This assessment of DREs and VRDs susceptibility to attack was provided by experts and
thus reflects elite opinion. However, lay opinion is also a necessary component in this
discussion. In a representative democracy, public opinion should be taken into account,
according to the democratic model proposed by Fiorino, when assessing risk environments that
has a direct impact on the health of a democracy.
Public opinion on DREs is quite straightforward – most American’s think that they
should produce a paper trail.68 When asked about “requiring electronic voting machines to print a
paper backup of the ballot,” 85% of respondents favored this, with 49% strongly favoring.69 The
results also hold across the partisan divide, with Democrats (and those who lean Democratic) and
Republicans (and those who lean democratic) supporting paper trails at 87% and 84%

“A Handbook for Elections Infrastructure Security,” 15.
Ibid., 18-19.
67
“What Is a DDoS Attack? Distributed Denial of Service.” Cisco. Accessed April 8, 2019.
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/what-is-a-ddos-attack.html.
68
“Views of Election Policy Proposals | Pew Research Center,” October 29, 2018.
https://www.people-press.org/2018/10/29/views-of-election-policy-proposals/.
69
Ibid.
65
66

24

respectively.70 Thus, both elite and democratic models align here meaning there is a clear
consensus for this policy.
For VRDs the picture is clouded by divisions in public opinion, and the lack of desire to
propose measures that may be counter to US democratic norms. Experts have summarily agreed
that improvements to state systems should be made, though no serious proposals for alternative
systems have been offered. Technical experts have not projected what a centralized, federal VRD
system, which could take the place of state VRDs, would look like. Also, there is no survey data
specifically on the question of the efficacy of a federal VRD.
Ordinary Americans seem to be fairly confident in their state’s system, while they seem
to be skeptical of the efficacy of federal systems:
The public is not highly confident that election systems in the U.S. are secure from
hacking and other technological threats. Currently, 45% of Americans say they are at
least somewhat confident that U.S. election systems are secure, though just 8% say they
are very confident in the security of these systems and 55% say they are not too (37%) or
not at all (17%) confident that these systems are secure…Americans express more
confidence about election systems in their state: Two-thirds (66%) say they are very or
somewhat confident that election systems in their state are secure from hacking and other
technological threats (though just 16% say they are very confident). A third (33%) of
adults are not too or not at all confident in the security of their state71
Also, public opinion on trust in the federal government to handle sensitive data provides
evidence against the prospect of a federal VRD. About half of those polled by Pew are not
confident that their private data will be properly protected by the federal government (only 12%
are very confident).72
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These concerns suggest that a policy solution that adds paper trails to DREs is needed
(considering both elite and democratic models). The picture with VRDs is complicated by the
fact that federal systems are judged to be susceptible by both experts and ordinary Americans but
ordinary Americans also believe that their states do a better job in securing DREs.

Policy Options

One policy option would be the status quo. Current policy could be left intact while
providing more funding to the states through HAVA (the federal government just provided 380
million dollars to the states to improve election infrastructure).73 Providing additional funding to
cash-poor states to improve election systems is one approach. In addition, the states could be
urged to become more involved with DHS in cyber security measures to protect VRDs more
effectively.

Secure Elections Act
An alternative policy option could look like the Secure Elections Act of 2017, which was
introduced in the House of Representatives in 2017. It mandated “states to use backup paper
ballots and to implement postelection audits to ensure that voting systems were not
compromised”.74 This mandate would have required DRE machines to produce a paper trail that
its internal tabulation could be checked against. The Republicans in Congress claimed the
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mandate for paper trails was outside of their authority, while the White House declared that it
violated states’ rights.75 If reconsidered, an effective argument would need to be made for how it
aligned with the Constitution and it would need to be coupled with funding to the state’s for this
purpose, which the Act did not initially provide.

For the People Act
Another policy option could look like the For the People Act of 2019. Democrats in the
House of Representatives introduced this Act to improve upon current federal standards.
According to the Brennen Center For Justice, the For The People Act would make it “easier for
voters to cast a ballot and harder for lawmakers to gerrymander, by transforming how campaigns
are funded to amplify the voices of ordinary Americans, and by bolstering election security and
government ethics”.76
The For the People Act does not amend the related provisions in HAVA to mandate
minimum cyber security standards; it is drafted to be in compliance with Section 303 from
HAVA. The only significant, potential updates are in Section 1915, Section 298, and Section
321. Section 1915 calls for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to assess its own
cybersecurity methods while Section 298 calls for cybersecurity enhancements, but the
suggestions refer to best practices and the specifics are left to the states.77 The last section to
address digital security is Section 321, which provides grants to entities “for purposes of research
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and development that are determined to have the potential to significantly to improve the security
(including cybersecurity), quality, reliability, accuracy, accessibility, and affordability of election
infrastructure”.78 These provisions largely leave in place current systems and do not provide
specific standards, besides “best practices.”
Both the Secure Elections Act and the For the People Act call for mandated paper trails
for DREs, which, as noted, is supported by public opinion at a rate of 85%.79 Thus, both elite and
democratic models align, which means there is a clear consensus for this policy.
For VRDs experts express a mixture of opinions on the necessary changes to current
policy and no expert advocate new policy for a federal VRD system. Some researchers suggest
additional cyber security measures on the state level using known techniques, some suggest
increased interaction with DHS, and others encourage experimentation with new technical
standards at the state level. Also, survey data to gauge the public’s opinion on different VRD
policies does not yet exist. Further research is needed to gauge expert and lay opinion on
different VRD policies.

Other Policy Options
New policy could induce the states to bolster their cyber security measures through
federal funding, which would be unlocked by adopting pre-defined layers of cyber security. The
first level of funding could be certification of VRDs. A second level could be for certification in
addition to adopting basic cyber security measures like access controls, passwords, multi-factor
authentication (MFA), logging and monitoring activity, training, regular back-ups, provisional
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ballots, and communicating with other states.80 A third level could be unlocked with
enhancements to supply chain security. This money, once unlocked, could be used by the states
to improve all election infrastructure, not just digital systems, making the inducements more
attractive. This would avoid creating a federal mandate, something that more conservative states
might see as federal overreach.
Alternatively, an innovative policy option like a federal VRD system with state of the art
cyber security features could be created and introduced in Congress. The features of this policy
would need to take into account current path dependencies and technical limitations (current
technology used in the states is larger made up of COTS hardware and software). The best way
to administer a federal VRD system could be a top-down approach, where the sensitive
information is stored at the local level. For instance, when individuals go to the DMV to get or
renew a license, they can provide a hand-written signature attesting to their desire to register to
vote. That paperwork could be stored at the DMV and then a federal VRD administrator could
contact the DMV office and verify that attestation, and add that individual as qualified voter for
an upcoming presidential election. This system could be enhanced with state of the art cyber
security, perhaps with a KSI Stack, which is discussed below.

Potential Technical Improvements to Digital Election Infrastructure

Open-Source Technology
One option to improve DEI would be to adopt open-source technology. The open-source
technology proposal could greatly increase transparency in DEI. Though this solution is not
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comprehensive, it could lead to a more democratic model of election administration. Currently,
proprietary code is used in DREs and other electronic voting machines. In addition, proprietary
companies have large, open supply chains that introduce more risk, as hardware and software are
vulnerable to tampering at several points in the supply chain. The Open Source Election
Technology Foundation (OSET) has developed an open-source approach to improving DEI and
voter confidence. Their mission is to “reinvent election technology by using open data, open
standards, and open source to increase confidence in elections and their outcomes, and help
preserve our democracy”.81 Open-source technology would be one effective way to improve
cyber security of DEI, and language mandating this technology could be inserted in new, federal
legislation. One significant advantage with this route is that it would avoid debate about federal
overreach if it is mainly focused on improvements to technology.

Estonian KSI Stack
A more radical improvement would be the KSI Stack system, which could be used at
either the federal or state level. The country of Estonia has a digital citizenship system, which is
the resource that Estonian election officials reference when determining if a citizen is legally
able to vote. The system provides state of the art cybersecurity while increasing efficiency. Their
“once-only” policy says that by law, the government can only ask for information from
individuals one time.82 This information is then shared within the government and is released to
private parties on a permission basis, and only in discrete amounts. The fact that information can
only be asked for once means that it must be securely stored indefinitely, which led directly to
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the adoption of an innovative record management system referred to as the Keyless Signature
Infrastructure (KSI) Stack. The KSI Stack creates a permanent and unalterable record of all data
according to the following principles:
KSI is a blockchain technology designed in Estonia and used globally to make sure
networks, systems and data are free of compromise, all while retaining 100% data
privacy. A blockchain is a distributed public ledger – a database with a set of pre-defined
rules for how the ledger is appended by the distributed consensus of the participants in
the system. Due to its widely witnessed property, blockchain technology makes it also
impossible to change the data already on the blockchain. With KSI Blockchain deployed
in Estonian government networks, history cannot be rewritten by anybody and the
authenticity of the electronic data can be mathematically proven. It means that no-one –
not hackers, not system administrators, and not even government itself – can manipulate
the data and get away with that83
US states could experiment with this technology for their VRDs and the results could be valuable
if a federal solution for VRD management is chosen in the future. Integration of this technology
in the US is not just hypothetical either. Guardtime, the company that developed the KSI Stack
for Estonia, has partnered with SICPA to offer their services to U.S. states for VRD
management.84
According to David Collingridge (a contributor to the edited volume by Hood and Jones
mentioned in my frames of analysis section) provides insight into why experimentation at the
local and state level is desirable:
Decision-makers can never relax in the assurance that they have identified the very best
option; any choice may be shown to be mistaken by future events that surprise the
decision-makers. However, much research and propaganda on risk assessment and
management assumes the very opposite; that some choices can be known to be the best
and, therefore, do not require any humility from the decision-makers’ search for
resilience as a counter to deep uncertainty. In reality, it is necessary to admit that all that
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can be hoped for is a more or less efficient trial-and-error learning from experience of
technology…85
Experimentation with new systems in the states is important because there are too many
unforeseen consequences when these systems are deployed too soon. From a risk management
perspective, if there is no experimentation stage then there will be little flexibility around the
three components of risk management (goal-setting, information gathering and interpretation,
and action to influence human behavior and modify physical structures).

Conclusion

To circle back to the research questions that guided this thesis: Why is US digital election
infrastructure (DEI) vulnerable and what are the possible options to better secure it? To answer
this question this thesis analyzed current federal policy governing DEI as well as current,
technical vulnerabilities.
On the level of policy, HAVA no longer adequately protects suffrage rights as a result of
its decentralized, hands-off approach to DEI. The hands-off approach of federal policy produces
four levels of variance: system (top-down, bottom-up, hybrid), legal framework (some lists
mentioned in statues, come are not), certification (eight states require certification), and cyber
security standards.
On the level of technical vulnerabilities, DREs and VRDs are both susceptible to
manipulation. Experts as well as ordinary Americans have provided a clear mandate to remove
DREs, or at a minimum, to provide a paper trail to DREs. This is a fairly substantive integration
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of elite and democratic models in risk management. Risk, as it pertains to consequence, would
clearly be mitigated if these machines are removed or at the very least paper trails are introduced.
For VRDs, the picture is muddied by lack of consensus, and thus there is little desire to
propose measures that may be counter to US democratic norms. Experts have summarily agreed
that improvements to state systems should be made. Technical experts have not projected what a
federal VRD system would look like, however. Also, there is no survey data specifically on the
question of the efficacy of a federal VRD.
Ordinary Americans seem to be fairly confident in their state’s system, while they seem
to be skeptical of the efficacy of federal systems.86 If another federal system were to be proposed
in Congress, an effective argument would have to be made as to why it would be superior to state
systems. Also, public opinion on trust in the federal government to handle sensitive data provides
further evidence for the prospect of a federal VRD.87
If a centralized system with superior cyber security was to be instituted, thus replacing
the extant patchwork of state systems, it would have to be aligned with the Constitution, current
policy, and democratic norms. The case therefore would need to be strong enough to overcome
contemporary partisan polarization on the issue of election administration.
Creating new a new VRD system at the federal level without first conducting a rigorous
trial of the system may introduce even more risk. It would be advisable to first experiment in the
states with new VRD solutions before creating a new federal system. The resilience of this
experimental system should undergo sufficient testing in a lower stakes environment, perhaps in
one municipality or in one state, where negative results can be contained.
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Other options considered were two recent federal policy proposals, the Secure Elections
Act and the For the People Act. While they do mandate a paper trail for DREs, they do not move
the needle on cyber security of VRDs. Neither provides a comprehensive solution adequate to
the threat level. Another option would be to induce the states to bolster their cyber security
measures by offering federal funding, which would be unlocked by adopting pre-defined layers
of cyber security. This option would avoid issuing a federal mandate but it is not clear whether
states who have no interest in improving their election infrastructure for partisan reasons would
be persuaded to improve security standards. Without a mandate, presidential elections may still
be plagued by significant variance in cyber security, thus leaving the nation open to attack.
Lastly, two intriguing, potential technical improvements have been detailed, the OSET,
open-source proposal, and the Estonian KSI Stack solution. The open-source technology
proposal could greatly increase transparency in DEI. Though this solution is not comprehensive,
it could lead to a more democratic model of election administration.
The second technical option discussed was the Estonian KSI Stack solution. States could
experiment with this technology to improve their VRDs, and if the results are positive, this
policy could diffuse to the federal government.
Suggestions for further research include scientific quantification of risk from the national
perspective, gathering survey data specifically on different policies for VRDs, estimations of cost
for different policy options, and projections of political feasibility. For the latter, a living sample
study could be conducted to gauge how public opinion on cyber security of DEI changes as it is
exposed to new data over time.
In summation, DEI is at risk because federal policy currently enables states to use DirectRecording Electronic (DRE) voting machines without a paper trail and it also enables states to

34

manage their own risk environment with digital voter registration databases (VRDs), which
produces significant variance in outcomes in cyber security and priority of VRD governance.
These factors combine to leave the existing system in a vulnerable state. The security flaws in
VRDs and DREs could be exploited in a targeted attack during a Presidential election, which
would likely result in disastrous consequences. Policy options and technical improvements
should be explored to properly secure suffrage rights. Regardless of partisan differences, all
Americans should be confident that their registration will be honored and that their votes will be
counted.
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